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Abstract
The basic idea of program evaluation is both simple and appealing.  Program outcomes are measured and
compared to some minimum performance standard or threshold. In practice, however, evaluation is quite
difficult. Two fundamental problems of outcome measurement must be addressed. The first, which we call
the problem of auxiliary outcomes, is that we do not observe outcome of interest. The second, which we
call the problem of counterfactual outcomes, is that we do not observe the threshold standard. This
paper examines how performance standards should be set and applied in the face of these problems in
measuring outcomes.  In particular, we consider the problem of evaluating the new World Bank sponsored
Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program. This competitive block grant program is to be judged
by the program’s effects on student outcomes, not by the particular ways in which the grantee
departments use their funds. Our central message is that the proper way to implement standards varies
with the prior information that the evaluator can credibly bring to bear to compensate for incomplete
outcome data.  An evaluator, confronted with the auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes problems, should
combine the available data with credible assumptions on treatments and outcomes.  Given this
information, the performance of a program may be deemed acceptable, unacceptable or indeterminate.1
1. Introduction
The Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program was recently initiated by the Indonesian
government’s Board of Higher Education (BHE) as a component of a portfolio of educational programs
supported by the World Bank.  As part of this program, competitive proposals for block grants to improve
the quality of undergraduate education in specific fields were solicited from academic departments
across the country.  In August 1997, 16 five-year grants were awarded with funding levels averaging
400,000 U.S. dollars per year.  By agreement between the BHE and the World Bank, the performance of the
QUE program is to be judged by the program’s effects on student outcomes, not by the particular ways in
which the grantee departments use their funds.  
Agencies operating social programs often use performance standards to evaluate success in
achieving outcomes of interest (e.g., see Cave and Hanney, 1992).  Program outcomes are measured and
compared with the standard, a threshold deemed to separate acceptable outcomes from unacceptable ones. 
An evaluation using a performance standard should specify not only the threshold to be used but also the
action to be taken if outcomes do not meet the threshold.  Discussions of performance standards are
often disappointingly vague about this critical matter.  However the idea usually seems to be that the
threshold should be set equal to an outcome level thought achievable by some alternative, perhaps a
change in the management of the program being evaluated or perhaps an entirely different program.  Then
a possible action is to replace the program being evaluated with the alternative if the program yields
an outcome below the threshold.  
Consider the problem of evaluating the QUE program in 2002.  The outcome of interest to the BHE
is, broadly speaking, the value to Indonesian society of having high quality university graduates.  The
threshold might be set as the outcome that would be expected under the baseline non-competitive grant
scheme. To cast this idea in conventional economic terms, we might interpret the BHE as wanting to
determine whether the QUE program maximizes the difference between the expected life-cycle discounted
earnings of university entrants and the cost of providing their education.  2
Evaluation using performance standards is clearly appealing in principle. The hard questions
concern implementation.  This paper examines two problems of outcome measurement that confront efforts
to implement standards.  These are the problem of auxiliary outcomes and the problem of counterfactual
outcomes.
The problem of auxiliary outcomes arises whenever considerations of timeliness or cost make it
infeasible to measure the program outcomes of ultimate interest. Since life-time earnings of university
entrants will not be revealed  until many years after the program evaluation in 2002, the BHE will not
observe the outcome of interest. With data on these outcomes unavailable, performance standards must be
stated in terms of auxiliary outcomes that can be measured.  In fact, the BHE has agreed to collect data
on at least seven auxiliary outcomes, which are officially termed performance indicators
evaluation problem is to use the available data on early outcomes to set standards, when the evaluator’s
real interest is in the lasting effects of the program.
  The problem of counterfactual outcomes concerns the alternative serving as the standard of
comparison.  Whereas the program being evaluated is operational and so its outcomes are at least
observable in principle, the alternative is not in operation and so its outcomes are counterfactual. The
data cannot reveal what would happen to university students under the baseline non-competitive grant
system. To appropriately set the threshold defining a performance standard, an evaluator must somehow
predict what outcomes would occur if the alternative were in operation.    
This paper examines how performance standards should be set and applied in the face of these
problems in measuring outcomes.  Our central message is that the proper way to implement standards
varies with the prior information that the evaluator can credibly bring to bear to compensate for
incomplete outcome data.  Of course, the assumptions an evaluator is willing to impose may vary from
case to case.  If this prior information is sufficiently  strong, the traditional practice of using a
single threshold to separate acceptable outcomes from unacceptable ones is appropriate.  An evaluator
having weaker prior information however, should set two thresholds rather than one.  The performance of
the program should be deemed acceptable if the observed auxiliary outcomes meet the higher 3
1 From Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) to Walley (1991), decision theorists have long struggled to
credibly deal with the ambiguity inherent in program evaluations and decision making.  No method of
resolving ambiguity (e.g., the maximin rule (Wald, 1950) and Bayesian decision rules (Berger, 1985; Spencer,
1985, Spencer and Mosses, 1990)) can ensure that expected outcomes are maximized.  In this paper, we analyze
the implications of indeterminacy which arises from two fundamental identification problems; the auxiliary
and counterfactual outcome problems.  While these two concerns are central, they certainly do not exhaust
the set of possible causes of ambiguity.  For a general discussion, see Manski (1999). 
threshold and unacceptable if they fall below the lower nonacceptance threshold.
If the auxiliary outcomes lie between these two thresholds, the performance of the program is
indeterminate.  In this case, there is insufficient basis for deciding whether the program being
evaluated should be continued or replaced by the alternative.  Decisions to continue the program or to
replace it are both defensible given the available information.  Efforts to obtain more information
before making a decision may be justified.
1
We develop these ideas in two stages.  Sections 2 and 3 consider the evaluation problem in some
generality.  Section 2 formalizes basic concepts: treatments, outcomes, programs, and treatment effects. 
Section 3 uses these concepts to address the problems of auxiliary outcomes and counterfactual outcomes
respectively.  These sections aim to make general points, so some of the discussion is necessarily
abstract.
In Sections 4 through 6, we shift from generalities to the specifics involved in evaluating the
new World Bank sponsored Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program.  Section 4 describes the QUE
program, which awards competitive five-year block grants to university departments to improve the
quality of their undergraduate curricula.  Sections 5 and 6 examine two distinct ways in which
performance standards will be used.  In the short run, the progress of QUE grantees in achieving
specified auxiliary outcome targets will be monitored.  Then, at the end of the five-year grant period,
the QUE program as a whole will be evaluated.
QUE is representative of a large class of programs that use block grants and similar
decentralized decision making mechanisms to achieve social objectives.  Our examination of the QUE
program has lessons for the evaluation of other block grant programs.  In particular, the analysis of4
2  A similar distinction is made in the literature on evaluating personnel, where both  a particular
job as well as the individuals who hold the job may be evaluated (Lazear, 1995, Chapter 8). 
3  Supposing that the outcome-of-interest is scalar does not rule out the possibility that a person
experiences multiple outcomes following treatment.  The outcome-of-interest transforms these multiple
outcomes into a single measure that expresses the overall value of the treatment.
Section 6 shows the need for integrated micro evaluation of particular grantees and macro evaluation of
the program as a whole.
2
Section 7 concludes by considering what a planner might do when the available information yields
an indeterminate finding about the performance of the program being evaluated. 
2. Concepts of Formal Evaluation
The usual formalization of a program evaluation assumes that each member j of a population J
receives one of several mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments.  Each member of this population
experiences a scalar outcome-of-interest that may depend on the treatment received.  The possible
treatments will be numbered t = 1,...,T.  The outcomes associated with these treatments are y(t), t =
1,...,T.
3  
The treatment that a person receives depends on the set of treatments available to this person
and on the person's choice of a treatment from this set.  Social programs help determine the set of
available treatments and thus influence the treatments that people receive.  It will suffice to consider
two programs.  One of these is the operational program being evaluated, labeled program A here.  The
other is the alternative with which the operational program is to be compared, labeled program B.  Let
zjA 0 T indicate the treatment that person j actually receives under program A, and let z
the treatment that this person would receive under program B.  Then the outcomes this person does
experience under program A and would experience under program B are y(zjA) and y(zjB) respectively.
The objective of the evaluation is to determine which yields the better outcomes, program A or5
4  Of course, one might consider evaluating other features of the distribution of outcomes. See,
for example, Manski (1995; 1997b) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997).
B.  The usual practice is to compare programs in terms of their mean outcomes across the population. In
conventional economic terms, we assume that the planner wants to maximize a utilitarian social welfare
function.
4 Let E[y(zA)] and E[y(zB)] denote the mean outcomes under programs A and B.  The quantity 
(1)  *(A, B)  /  E[y(zA)] - E[y(zB)]
is the average treatment effect of program A relative to program B.  If *(A, B) is positive, the
performance of program A may be deemed acceptable.  Thus the mean outcome of program B provides the
threshold relative to which program A’s outcomes are judged.
Implementing the performance standard is straightforward if the evaluator observes the outcomes
y(zA) and y(zB) of the members of the population, or at least those of random samples of the population. 
Then the evaluator may learn the mean outcomes E[y(zA)] and E[y(zB)] and determine whether the former
exceeds the latter.
Our concern is with evaluation in the absence of complete outcome data.  The problem of
auxiliary outcomes arises when the evaluator observes a vector of auxiliary outcomes of program A, say
w(zA), but not the outcome-of-interest y(zA).  The problem of counterfactual outcomes is that, program B
not being in operation, its outcomes are unobservable in principle.
To illustrate these concepts, consider the problem of evaluating the QUE program.  In this case,
the set T of possible treatments may index different types of funding mechanisms;  university funding
might vary by the allocation scheme (competitive versus non-competitive), the levels and types of
assistance, the restrictions on inputs and outputs, and the criteria for future funding. Program A may
be some version of the competitive block grant funding introduced by the QUE program, and program B may
be the baseline non-competitive allocation system.  The outcome-of-interest y may measure life-time6
5  In Section 4, we provide additional details on the auxiliary outcome measures collected by the
BHE for the QUE program and the alternative.
earnings.  The observed auxiliary outcomes w might measure cognitive ability in year 2002.
The performance of the QUE program may be deemed acceptable if mean present discounted value of
life-time earnings is higher under the QUE program than under the baseline alternative.  The problem of
auxiliary outcomes is that only cognitive status is observed under the operational program.  The problem
of counterfactual outcomes is that no outcome measurements at all are possible under the counterfactual
alternative to program A.
3. Problems of Outcome Measurement
In this section, we provide a general introduction to the problems of auxiliary and
counterfactual outcomes.  In Section 3.1 we investigate the problem of auxiliary outcomes and offer two
possible solutions, both of which rely on historical data.   Abstracting from the problem of
counterfactual outcomes, we suppose that the evaluator sets a threshold that the mean outcome of program
A must meet to be deemed acceptable.  Then, in Section 3.2 we examine how this threshold is determined.
In particular, we describe the problem of counterfactual outcomes, and review some of the possible
solutions to this problem. 
3.1 The Problem of Auxiliary Outcomes
Abstracting from the problem of counterfactual outcomes, let c denote the threshold set by the
evaluator.  Then the criterion for judging the performance of program A is this:
(2)  Program A is acceptable if E[y(zA)]  $  c.
 7
6  A common practice is to judge Program A to be acceptable if the expected value of a chosen scalar
function of the auxiliary outcomes meets a specified threshold.  Thus performance criterion (2) is replaced
by one of the form 
(*)  Program A is acceptable if E{f[w(zA)]} $ d.
Here f(·) is the chosen function and d is the specified threshold.  It follows from the law of iterated
expectations that E{f[w(zA)]} =  E[y(zA)] if f(·) is chosen to be the function f(s)  =  E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s].
With this choice of f(·) and with d set equal to c, performance criteria (2) and (*) are equivalent.
Application of criterion (*) with other choices of f(.) and d may lead to distorted conclusions about the
acceptability of the program being evaluated. 
The evaluator observes only the auxiliary outcomes w(zA) of the population and not their
outcomes-of-interest y(zA).  The problem is to use the data on auxiliary outcomes to learn about
E[y(zA)].  For convenience, suppose that the auxiliary outcome vector w can take S possible values,
numbered s = 1,...,S.  Use the law of iterated expectations to write
                   S
(3)  E[y(zA)]  =   E E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s]·P[w(zA) = s].
                  s=1
Here E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s] is the mean value of the outcome-of-interest among the people who realize  value
s of the auxiliary outcome, and P[w(zA) = s] is the fraction of the population who realize  value s.
The practical problem, of course, is that auxiliary outcome data alone do not reveal the
conditional means E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s], s = 1,...,S.  Thus implementation of criterion (2) is possible
only if the evaluator can bring to bear other information that reveal E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s], s = 1,...,S.
The possibilities explored here all assume the existence of some historical period in which data
were collected on both the auxiliary outcomes w and the outcome-of-interest y.  These historical data
may pertain to an environment that is different in some respects from that of program A.  For instance,
the BHE may have access to data collected under different economic conditions, different political
regimes or even different countries.  The data may nevertheless be used to inform the evaluation of8
program A, provided that the historical period for which (w, y) data are available shares some common
features with the environment under program A.  Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 make this explicit.  
3.1.1 The Equal-Conditional-Means Assumption
Let the observable historical distribution of (w, y) be denoted PH(w, y).  Assume that each
value of w realized by a positive fraction of the population under program A was also realized by a
positive fraction of the population in the historical period. Now assume that, for each s such that
P[w(zA) = s] > 0, the conditional mean outcome y(zA) under program A equals the conditional mean
historical outcome y.  That is, the historical data yield an unbiased conditional forecast:
(4)  E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s]  =  EH(y*w = s).
This equal-conditional-means assumption and the law of iterated expectations (3) yield
                   S
(5)  E[y(zA)]  =   E EH(y*w = s)·P[w(zA) = s].
                  s=1
By assumption (4), the historical data on (w, y) reveal EH(y*w = s) whenever P[w(zA) = s] >  0.  The
auxiliary outcome data on program A reveal P[w(zA) = s] for all values of s.  Hence the evaluator can
use the right side of equation (5) to learn E[y(zA)] and so judge the performance of program A. 
The credibility of the equal-conditional-means assumption must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.  The identity of the measured auxiliary outcomes may be critical, the assumption being credible
for some specifications of the auxiliary outcomes but not for others.  Often, planners choose auxiliary9
7 Treatments and covariates can serve as auxiliary outcomes.  To formalize treatment as an auxiliary
outcome, we simply define w(zA)  / z A.  A covariate  — e.g., race or sex — is simply an auxiliary outcome
whose value varies across the population but not across treatments; that is, w(zA) does not vary with z A.
Thus treatments and covariates are two polar forms of auxiliary outcomes. 
outcome measures which are arguably related to both the intervention and the outcome of interest.
There are, however, no general criteria for ensuring the credibility of the assumption.
For the QUE program, the BHE has agreed to collect data on at least seven auxiliary outcomes,
many of which measure cognitive skills.  The equal-conditional-means assumption states that the
unobserved mean life-cycle earnings of persons who have measured cognitive skills s in 2002 equals the
observed historical mean life-cycle earnings among persons who had measured cognitive skills s.  Is this
a reasonable assumption?  It is if one thinks that the QUE program influences earnings through its
effect on measured cognitive skills, but not otherwise.  The assumption is less reasonable if one thinks
that the program may influence earnings through a process that does not entirely manifest itself in the
measured cognitive skills.
3.1.2 Bounded Conditional-Means Assumptions
An equal-conditional-means assumption is sufficient but not necessary to determine if the
performance of program A is acceptable.  Whereas this assumption identifies E[y(zA)], we only need to
learn if E[y(zA)] meets the threshold c.
A flexible way to weaken the equal-conditional-means assumption is to use knowledge of E
s) to bound E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s].  Supposing that y takes positive values, a particularly simple 
conditional-means assumption is
(6)  "·EH(y*w = s)  #  E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s]  #  ß·EH(y*w = s),
Here " and ß are constants such that 0 # " # ß # 4.  These constants, specified by the evaluator,10
8  As we do here, the literature on sensitivity analysis (see, for example, Cornfield et. al.,
(1959), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Rosenbaum (1995, Chapter 4)) examines the implications of varying
certain unknown constants or parameters within some class of models. This literature, however, does not
address the evaluator’s problem of making decisions when the findings are ambiguous. That is, if  " < (  <
$, the performance of A is indeterminate. 
express the strength of the association that the evaluator feels comfortable asserting between E
s) and E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s].  If " = ß = 1, we have the equal-conditional-means assumption.  If  
ß = 4, measurement of EH(y*w = s) reveals nothing about E[y(zA)*w(zA) = s].
Assumption (6) and the law of iterated expectations (3) imply this bound on E[y(z
        S                                            S 
(7)  " E EH(y*w = s)·P[w(zA) = s]  #  E[y(zA)]  #  ß E EH(y*w = s)·P[w(zA) = s].
       s=1                                          s=1
If the lower bound on E[y(zA)] meets the threshold c, the evaluator can conclude that the performance of
program A is acceptable.  If the upper bound on E[y(zA)] is less than c, he can conclude that the
program’s performance is unacceptable. 
Many values of the constants " and ß will lead to a definitive evaluation.  Let 
             S                       
(8)  ( = c / E EH(y*w = s)·P[w(zA) = s].
            s=1                      
From (7) we see that if " $ ( the program should be accepted and if ß # ( the program’s performance is
unacceptable. An evaluator need only know that " or ß satisfy one of these inequalities to judge the
efficacy of the program.  Otherwise, the status of program A is indeterminate given the available data
and prior information.
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Consider the QUE program.  There are many reasons why an evaluator may not be willing to make an
equal-conditional-means assumption.  It may be that schooling norms have changed between the historical
period and the present, with consequent changes in the association between schooling and life-cycle
earnings.  Or it may be that the very act of evaluating the QUE program has incentive effects that alter
the association between cognitive skills and earnings.  Administrators of the program, knowing that
measured cognitive skills will be used to evaluate program performance, may choose to emphasize forms of
schooling that have measurable effects on cognitive skills rather than ones whose effects become
measurable later on.  This is particularly true for  manipulable indicators such as grade point average.
Concerned with these and other possibilities, the evaluator may find a bounded-conditional-means
assumption to be more credible.  If, for instance, performance indicators might be inflated due to the
Hawthorne effect, the evaluator may want to assume (6) with " = 0 and ß = 1.  That is, he may be willing
to assume that the unobserved mean earnings among persons with cognitive status s in 2002 is no greater
than the historical mean earnings with cognitive status s.  This assumption may suffice to judge whether
the QUE program is unacceptable.
3.2 The Problem of Counterfactual Outcomes
Discussions of performance standards often exhibit considerable lack of clarity on how the
threshold separating acceptable from unacceptable performance should be set and what action should be
taken if performance is deemed unacceptable.  Much of the difficulty that evaluators have in specifying
thresholds and actions stems from the problem of counterfactual outcomes.  In principle, the threshold
should be set equal to a mean outcome level known to be achievable by an alternative feasible program,
and this alternative should replace the operational program if the threshold is not met.  However the
outcomes that would occur under counterfactual alternatives are not observable.  Hence, even abstracting
from the problem of auxiliary outcomes, evaluators inevitably find it hard to specify what constitutes
acceptable program performance.12
9  Whereas a variable v was originally called an instrumental variable if v has zero covariance with
a residual  , from the response function, the modern usage of the term has broadened to embrace assumptions
that specified functions of v and  , are orthogonal.  Hence it is now necessary to specify the type of IV
assumption one has in mind. Mean independence, quantile independence, and statistical independence
assumptions (or the orthogonality conditions that these assumptions yield) have all been prominent in the
literature.  See Manski (1988) pp. 25-26 and Section 6.1 for discussion of the history and exposition of
the variety of modern IV assumptions.
The rich econometric literature on the analysis of treatment effects teaches that there is no
unique resolution of the problem of counterfactual outcomes.  The conclusions that can be drawn about
the outcomes of counterfactual programs depend critically on what historical data are available and what
prior information the evaluator can credibly bring to bear.
The dominant concern of the econometric literature has been to predict the outcomes of mandatory
treatment programs — ones giving the same treatment to all members of the population — when the
available historical data pertain to an environment in which treatment varies across the population.  In
this context, the problem of counterfactual outcomes is known as the selection problem.  Analyses of the
selection problem show that if historical data on the outcome of interest are combined with sufficiently
strong assumptions, the counterfactual mean outcome E[y(zB)] may be identified, implying a well-defined
threshold for judging the performance of program A.  In practice, the most common assumption is that
treatments are statistically independent of outcomes in the historical data, as they would be in a
classical randomized experiment.  An alternative route to identification is to assert a parametric
latent variable model jointly describing how treatments are selected and outcomes determined.  Another
alternative is to assume that treatment effects are constant across the population and that there exists
some covariate, termed an instrumental variable, that is independent of outcomes but not of treatments.
See Björklund and Moffitt (1987),  Friedlander, Greenberg and Robins (1997), Heckman and Honore (1990),
Heckman and Hotz (1989), Heckman and Robb (1985),  Maddala (1983), and Manski (1989, 1995) for reviews
of the literature.
Concern with the validity of the strong assumptions needed to identify treatment effects has led
to the recent development of a literature imposing weak assumptions that yield bounds on the13
counterfactual mean outcome E[y(zB)].  The starting point is to ask what can be learned about E[y(z
from the historical data if no assumptions at all are made about the process determining treatment
selection and outcomes.  The result is a “no-assumptions” bound on E[y(zB)].  From this base, the
evaluator may impose weak assumptions that have identifying power in the sense that they yield narrower
bounds.  One set of results illuminates the identifying power of instrumental variable assumptions when
imposed alone, treatment effects not being assumed to be constant across the population.  See Balke and
Pearl (1997), Hotz, Mullins and Sanders (1997), Manski (1990, 1994), Manski and Pepper (2000), Robins
(1989), and Robins and Greenland (1996).  Another set of results shows the identifying power of various
assumptions about the treatment selection process when nothing is known about the process determining
outcomes.  For example, one may assume that each member of the population was assigned the treatment
yielding the better outcome for that person.  See Manski (1994, 1995), and Manski and Nagin (1998).  Yet
another set of results shows the identifying power of assumptions about the process determining outcomes
when nothing is known about the treatment selection process.  For example, one may assume that treatment
response is monotone, in the sense that the outcome of one treatment is always at least as good as the
outcome of the other.  See Manski (1995, 1997a) and Pepper (2000).
When the available historical data and assumptions suffice to bound but not identify E[y(z
the conventional idea of using a single threshold to separate acceptable from unacceptable outcomes
needs revision.  Suppose that the available historical data and credible assumptions imply that c
E[y(zB)] # c1, for known constants c0 and c1.  Suppose that the available historical data, auxiliary
outcome data, and credible assumptions imply that d0 # E[y(zA)] # d1, for known constants d
Then the evaluator may conclude that
(9)  Program A is acceptable if d0 - c1 $ 0 and unacceptable if d1 - c0 < 0.
Otherwise, the performance of program A relative to B is indeterminate.
The same considerations apply when the alternative program B does not mandate a single treatment14
but rather permits treatment to vary across the population (see Manski, 1997b and Pepper, 1999).  The
general point remains that application of a conventional performance standard with a single threshold to
separate acceptable from unacceptable outcomes is appropriate only if the evaluator can bring to bear
sufficiently strong data and assumptions.  In other settings, the performance of program A has three
possible states: acceptable, unacceptable, or indeterminate.  
Consider the QUE program.  Suppose that the alternative is the non-competitive allocation
method.   How might the evaluator predict what the outcome (e.g., life-time earnings) would be under the
baseline alternative? The BHE might make the fixed-effects assumption that, in the absence of the QUE
grant, students in a department would experience the same outcomes as the students in this department
actually did experience in the pre-QUE period before 1997.  This assumption of historical continuity is
plausible if there have been no changes in the department’s environment over time. Alternatively, the
BHE might make the comparison-group assumption that, in the absence of the QUE grant, a department’s
students would experience the same outcomes as the students in similar departments that do not have QUE
grants actually experience in the period 1997 - 2002.  This assumption is plausible if the BHE can
credibly identify a comparison group — similar departments except that they do not have QUE grants.
It may be that the fixed-effects and comparison-group assumptions both have some plausibility,
as do certain other assumptions, but that no one assumption stands out as clearly correct.  In this
situation, which we regard as likely in practice, the BHE should bring to bear all of the plausible
assumptions, thus yielding a bound on E[y(zB)].  If there is concern about the credibility of certain
assumptions but not others, the BHE might bound disagreements about the evaluation by estimating the
expected counterfactual outcome under a sequence of progressively stronger assumptions.  As assumptions
are added, the bound on E[y(zB)] may narrow but may also be less credible.
4. The “Quality of Undergraduate Education” Program in Indonesia15
In the remainder of the paper, we examine some of the specific issues involved in evaluating the
QUE program.  In this section, we describe the established features of the program and call attention to
important unresolved questions.  With this as background, Sections 5 and 6 examine the particular
monitoring and evaluation problems associated with this program.
4.1. Basic Description of the QUE Program
With the assistance of the World Bank, the Government of Indonesia has embarked upon an effort
to improve the quality of education through the greater use of incentives in budgetary allocation
decisions. The general approach is to allocate some fraction of the development budget based on
competitively awarded performance based grants.  Under the old regime the allocation decisions were non-
competitive.
The Quality of Undergraduate Education (QUE) program was recently initiated by the Indonesian
government’s Board of Higher Education (BHE) as a component of this effort.   All academic departments
in public universities were invited to submit proposals for block grants to improve the quality of the
undergraduate education they provide. The first round of the competition for these grants was carried
out in 1997.  Pre-proposals were received from 317 departments, 45 of which were invited to submit
proposals.  In August 1997, 16 five-year grants were awarded with funding levels averaging 400,000 U.S.
dollars per year. The grants are meant to provide new funding to the recipient departments,
supplementing their regular budgets.   
Departments submitting proposals were required to provide self-assessments of their strengths
and weaknesses and to propose action plans detailing the use they would make of BHE funding.  However
the terms of the grants give recipients full discretion in the use of the new funds.  By agreement
between the BHE and the World Bank, the performance of the QUE program is to be judged by the program’s
effects on student outcomes, not by the particular ways in which the grantee departments use their
funds.
The outcome of interest to the BHE is, broadly speaking, the value to Indonesian society of16
having high quality university graduates, both of the departments that receive QUE grants and of those
which do not.  In practice, the BHE and the World Bank have agreed that the program will be first
monitored and then evaluated using data to be collected on at least these seven auxiliary outcomes,
which are officially termed performance indicators:
  w1. NEE Score - average score of the department’s students on the National Entrance
      Examination.  (The NEE is used to admit students to departments.)
  w2. GPA - average Grade Point Average of students enrolled in the department.
  w3. TOEFL Score - average score on the Test of English as a Foreign Language,
      administered to graduating students. 
  w4. Time to Degree - average length of time that students are enrolled in the department
      en route to graduation.
  w5. Time to Employment - average length of time that students take to secure employment
      following graduation.
 w6. GRE Score - average score on the subject-area Graduate Record Examination,
      administered to graduating students. 
  w7. Peer Evaluation - a rating of department quality by international peer reviewers.
4.2. Monitoring and Evaluation
The BHE and the World Bank have agreed to monitor the auxiliary outcomes experienced by the
current grantees during 1997 - 2002 and then to evaluate the QUE program in 2002 at the end of the five-
year grant period.  Monitoring means that the BHE will assess the performance of grantees in achieving
auxiliary outcome targets agreed upon by the grantees and the BHE. If a department’s performance in
meeting its targets is deemed to be inadequate, the BHE may take limited corrective actions depending on
the particulars of the case.  It may, for example, provide technical assistance to a department with
inexperienced personnel.  It may also delay the release or reduce the size of a payment.  The17
10  There are numerous other reasonable possibilities.  Here are two other schemes which also
maintain a constant level of funding for the QUE program:
• Indefinite Funding - One interpretation of the QUE program is that the sixteen grants awarded in
1997 would be continued indefinitely, with no new grants being awarded to other departments.
• Open Re-competition - A second interpretation is that a new grant competition would be held every
five years, all university departments being eligible to compete as in the initial competition in
1997.  Present grantees would be eligible to submit new proposals but would enjoy no special status
when the grants are re-competed.
It is easy enough to think of variations on these possibilities, as well as other options that become
feasible if the funding level of the QUE program is itself considered variable.
presumption, however, is that barring an incident of gross negligence or fraud, the grantee will
continue to receive its annual funding throughout the five-year grant period.  See Section 5 for further
discussion.
Although monitoring has some of the character of an evaluation, the BHE usefully maintains a
distinction between monitoring and the evaluation of the QUE program that will take place in 2002, when
the BHE must decide whether to continue the QUE program or to replace it with an alternative.  At this
point, we need to confront the fact that the QUE program is a work in progress rather than a fully-
articulated funding program.  The BHE and World Bank have not yet stated what it would mean to continue
the QUE program after 2002. 
In Section 6, we select one version of the QUE program and one alternative for further study. 
In particular, we suppose that in 2002 the BHE will interpret the QUE program to use a 
grant renewal design, such that grantees would have their grants renewed for an additional five-year
period if their measured auxiliary outcomes are judged to be acceptable, but not renewed if their
auxiliary outcomes are judged non-acceptable.  Every five years a new grant competition would be held to
re-allocate those QUE funds that become available when some grantees do not have their grants renewed.
We suppose that the relevant alternative is the baseline non-competitive funding system used until18
11  There are numerous other alternatives.  In fact, each definition of the QUE program implies
different alternatives to QUE.  Suppose, for example, that the BHE should interpret the QUE program to mean
indefinite funding of the present grantees.  Then the performance-based renewal design would provide an
alternative to QUE.  Other alternatives might retain the competitive funding idea of QUE but alter the
number of grants or the award per grantee. 
1997.
11 In the notation of Sections 2 and 3, the performance based renewal QUE is program A and the
baseline alternative is program B.
Performance-based renewal is a particularly interesting interpretation of QUE because it
encompasses indefinite funding and open re-competition as special cases.  If the threshold for grant
renewal is set so low that all existing grants are renewed, performance-based renewal is equivalent to
indefinite funding for the sixteen departments awarded grants in 1997.  If the threshold is set so high
that no existing grants are renewed, performance-based renewal is equivalent to open re-competition.
5. Monitoring The QUE Grantees
Grants from government agencies commonly carry provisions for monitoring grantees during the
periods of their grants.  Monitoring often focuses on matters of process -- how the grant is managed,
the nature of the expenditures made, etc.  In contrast, the QUE program calls for monitoring certain
outcomes realized by grantees. 
Each of the sixteen QUE grants specified target changes in performance indicators w1 through w5
to be achieved 2.5 years and five years after grant initiation.  These midterm and final targets, which
vary across the departments receiving grants, were established by negotiation between the BHE and the
departments.  These targets are conservative so that a non-positive report would indicate the need for
some type of corrective action or additional supervision. The BHE has yet to determine how it will use
the targets to assess departments’ performance and the actions it will take if the target is not met. 19
We consider the monitoring question here, restricting attention to the midterm targets.  As will become
evident in Section 6, evaluation of the QUE program at the end of five years involves distinct
considerations. 
Consider the situation of one QUE grantee, the Department of Civil Engineering  at the
University of Indonesia. Table 1 displays the target standards (T) as well as the baseline values for
the performance indicators of this department.  In 2000, 2.5 years after the grants were awarded, the
evaluator will observe the realized auxiliary outcomes (R).  Let wTj and wRj denote this department’s
midterm target and realized values of the performance indicators w1 through w5.  The discussion of
Section 3 suggests that the BHE should view these performance indicators as auxiliary outcomes which may
be used to predict the outcome-of-interest, namely the value to Indonesian society of having high
quality university graduates. 
Formally, let the QUE program be designated as program A,  Let Ij(A) denote the average life-
cycle discounted earnings of enrollees in department j under the QUE program.  Let Nj(A) denote the
number of university entrants who enroll in department j.  Let Cj(A) be the budget that this department
receives under the QUE program.  Then we take the outcome-of-interest yj(A) to be the difference between
the earnings of department j’s enrollees and the cost of operating the educational component of this
department, namely
(10)  yj(A)  / Nj(A)·Ij(A) - Cj(A).
Let E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wTj] and E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wRj] be the mean values of the outcome-of-interest
conditional on the performance indicators taking the values wTj and wRj respectively.  Then the BHE
might use this criterion to monitor the midterm performance of department j: 
(11)  Midterm Performance is acceptable if E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wRj]  $  E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wTj].20
To implement this criterion as stated requires that the BHE know the conditional means
E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wRj] and E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wTj].  As discussed in Section 3.1, these quantities are
knowable if historical data on (w, y) are available and if the BHE is able to credibly assert the equal-
conditional-means assumption.  Under weaker bounded-conditional-means assumptions of the form discussed
in Section 3.2, the BHE can conclude that midterm performance is acceptable if the lower bound on
E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wRj] is greater than or equal to the upper bound on E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wTj].  Likewise, if
the upper bound on E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wRj] lies below the lower bound on E[y(zA)*w(zA) = wTj] the BHE can
conclude that midterm performance is unacceptable.  If neither of these conditions hold, then midterm
performance is indeterminate.
There are other assumptions that the BHE might want to bring to bear.  It may, for example, be
that the mean value of the outcome-of-interest varies monotonically with each of the five performance
indicators.  In particular, the value of university graduates may be thought to be increasing in their
test scores (w1, w2, w3) and decreasing in the times (w4, w5) required to obtain their degrees and find
employment.  Under this assumption, the BHE can conclude that midterm performance is acceptable
(unacceptable) if all of the five realized values of the indicators are better (worse) than the
corresponding target values.  If some realized indicators are better than their target values and others
worse, then midterm performance is indeterminate.
6. Evaluation of QUE: Comparison of Performance-Based Renewal and Non-competitive Funding
In this section we examine the BHE’s decision problem in 2002, at the end of the five-year grant
period.  In particular, we consider how the BHE might compare performance-based QUE grant renewal
(Program A) with the alternative of baseline non-competitive funding (Program B).  Our discussion is
intended to develop some important points, but not to cover all of the difficult issues that the BHE may
need to consider.  Hence we shall make some simplifying assumptions.  These are21
12 The analysis can be redone with different assumptions about the degree of substitution and the
size of the grant for each department.  In particular, basic evaluation methodology applies as long as the
(A1) In 2002, the BHE is only concerned with the next round of five-year QUE grants.  It does not
commit itself to the QUE program beyond 2007 nor otherwise consider how departments should be
funded beyond that date.
(A2) Departments that receive QUE grants continue to receive their baseline non-competitive funding
as well.  The size of QUE grants is not a decision variable for the BHE.  All QUE grants have
the same pre-determined size, denoted G.
(A3) Should a department receiving a 1997 QUE grant have its grant renewed in 2002, students who
enroll in this department in the period 2002 - 2007 realize the same average outcomes as do
students in this department in the period 1997-2002.  Students who enroll during 2002 - 2007 in
departments that receive new QUE grants in 2002 realize the same average outcomes as do students
who enroll during 1997 - 2002 in the sixteen departments receiving QUE grants in 1997. 
(A4) Continuation of the QUE program from 2002 to 2007 only affects the sixteen departments that
receive grants in 2002.  Departments that do not receive grants at that time have the same
funding and student outcomes under the performance-based QUE grant renewal and the alternative
of the baseline non-competitive funding program.
Assumptions (A1) through (A4) greatly simplify the BHE’s evaluation problem.  We caution,
however, that these assumptions should not be taken lightly.  The BHE should, in principle, think beyond
the next round of grants and so (A1) may not hold.  University administrations may seek to use QUE
funding to substitute for departmental baseline funding, thereby violating (A2).  Moreover, the BHE may
give QUE grants of different sizes to different departments, also violating (A2).
12  Assumption (A3) is22
evaluator knows the net costs of the program for each department.
plausible if relevant aspects of the higher education environment — the characteristics of university
students, the mix of departments applying for QUE grants, the BHE’s decision process in awarding grants,
the state of the Indonesian labor market, etc. — do not change between 1997 and 2002.  However changes
in the environment may occur and make this assumption suspect.  For example, the mix of departments
applying for new QUE grants in 2002 may differ from the mix that applied in 1997.
As for Assumption (A4), there are several reasons why the QUE program may affect departments
that do not receive grants.  QUE funding may allow the departments that receive grants to compete more
effectively for students, thus altering the student bodies at non-recipient departments.  QUE funding
may allow students in departments that receive grants to compete more effectively for a limited supply
of jobs after graduation, thus altering the job prospects of the graduates of other departments. 
Moreover, the process of writing proposals for QUE funding may lead departments to critically appraise
and improve their educational programs, even if they do not receive funding.
With these caveats in mind, we lay out general features of the evaluation problem in Section 6.1
and then develop the implications of Assumptions (A1) through (A4) in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.  In Section
6.2, we abstract from the problems of auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes and consider how the BHE
should act if it were somehow to have complete outcome data.  In Section 6.3, we consider how the BHE
should act given the outcome data that are likely to be available.
6.1. General Features of the Evaluation Problem
Let us suppose that there is a population J of university departments in Indonesia.  In general
terms, the QUE program affects the funding of these departments.  Abstracting from QUE, let F denote a
program for funding university departments.  The mean outcome of funding program F is23
                     1    
(12)  E[yj(F)]  /   ——    3  Nj(F)·Ij(F) - Cj(F),
                    *J*  j 0 J
where *J* is the number of university departments.  We shall interpret the BHE as wanting to choose a
funding program that maximizes E[yj(F)].
By assumption, the feasible options are the performance-based renewal version of the QUE program
and the baseline noncompetitive funding mechanism.  In the notation of Sections 2 and 3, QUE is program
A and the baseline alternative is program B. Applying equation (12), we suppose that the BHE would judge
QUE to have acceptable outcomes if
(13)    3   [Nj(A)·Ij(A) - Nj(B)·Ij(B)]  - [Cj(A) - Cj(B)]  $  0.
      j 0 J
6.2. Evaluation With Complete Outcome Data
From this point on, we maintain Assumptions (A1) through (A4).  Let J1 denote the sixteen
departments that received QUE grants in 1997.  Let
                    1
(14)  *1(A, B)  /  ——   3   [Nj(A)·Ij(A) - Nj(B)·Ij(B)  - G] 
                   16  j 0 J1
be the average difference between the outcomes that these departments realize and those that they would
have experienced if they had not received QUE grants. Recall that G = Cj(A) - Cj(B) is the size of the
QUE grant, which is approximately 400,000 U.S. dollars per year. 
Let J2 denote a hypothetical set of sixteen departments that would receive grants in 2002 if QUE24
is continued.  Some of these, denoted J21, would be members of J1 that have their grants renewed.  The
remaining 16 - *J21* members of J2 would be new grant recipients.  Assumption (A1) through (A3) imply
that the average difference between the outcomes that the departments in J2 would realize with their QUE
grants and those that they would experience in the absence of the grants is 
                    1
(15)  *2(A, B)  /  ——    3   [Nj(A)·Ij(A) - Nj(B)·Ij(B)  - G] 
                   16   j 0 J2
                    1
                =  —— { [16 - *J21*]·*1(A, B)  +  3   [Nj(A)·Ij(A) - Nj(B)·Ij(B)  - G]}.
                   16                           j 0 J21
The term [16 - *J21*]·*1(A, B) on the right side of (18) reflects the second part of Assumption (A3),
which states that students in departments that receive new QUE grants in 2002 realize the same average
outcomes as do students in the sixteen departments who received QUE grants in 1997. 
By Assumption (A4), the QUE program does not affect departments that do not receive grants. 
Hence, in 2002, the BHE should use a two-stage process to decide which department should have their
grants renewed and whether the QUE program should be continued.  First, the BHE should choose J
maximize *2(A, B).  This is accomplished by renewing the grants to departments whose outcomes are better
than the group average *1(A, B).  Second, the BHE should continue the QUE program if the resulting value
of *2(A, B) is greater than or equal to zero.  Formally, 25
Decision Stage 1: Selection of J21
Let j 0 J1.  Subject to continuation of QUE, renew the grant to department j if
(16)   Nj(A)·Ij(A) - Nj(B)·Ij(B)  - G  $   *1(A, B).
Decision Stage 2: Continuation of QUE
With J21 determined in Stage 1, continue the QUE program if
(17)  *2(A, B)  $  0.
Given Assumptions (A1) through (A4) and the availability of complete outcome data, this two-
stage decision process provides a complete prescription for BHE evaluation of the QUE program.  The
prescription employs performance standards at both macro and micro levels.  At the macro level expressed
in Stage 2, the BHE judges QUE to be acceptable if its outcomes are at least as good as those that would
be achieved under the alternative of baseline non-competitive funding.  To determine whether QUE meets
this macro criterion, the BHE employs performance standards at the micro level expressed in Stage 1. 
Here the BHE judges each current grant recipient, deciding that performance is acceptable if the
grantee’s outcomes are at least as good as the average outcome realized by all departments currently
receiving grants.  Observe that this micro criterion differs from the one discussed in Section 5, in
which each grantee’s performance is judged relative to its own target values of specified performance
indicators.
6.3. Evaluation With Incomplete Outcome Data
Implementation of the two-stage decision process developed in Section 6.2 requires that, in
2002, the BHE know the values of Nj(A), Ij(A), Nj(B), and Ij(B) for each of the departments j 
receiving a QUE grant in 1997.  The only one of these quantities that is directly observable is N26
the number of students who actually enroll in department j in the period 1997 - 2002.  We shall assume
for simplicity that Nj(B), the counterfactual number of students who would enroll if department j were
not to receive the QUE grant, equals Nj(A).  This done, we may focus attention on what seem the two
central problems of incomplete outcome data faced by the BHE, namely that Ij(A) and Ij(B) are not
observable.
The absence of data on Ij(A), the average life-cycle earnings of students who actually enroll in
department j during 1997 - 2002, is a problem of auxiliary outcomes.  With the passage of time, the
value of Ij(A) in principle becomes observable.  In 2002, however, the BHE will only observe the
outcomes w1 through w7 and, perhaps, other yet-to-be determined performance indicators for department j. 
The absence of data on Ij(B), the average earnings that students in department j would experience in the
absence of the department’s QUE grant, is a problem of counterfactual outcomes.  Department j does have
the QUE grant so it is impossible to observe what would have happened otherwise.
If the BHE, by combining extensive auxiliary outcome data and historical data with strong
assumptions, is able to infer the unobserved values of Ij(A) and Ij(B) for j 0 J1, then the two-stage
decision process described in Section 6.2 can be implemented.  It may well be, however, that the
available data and assumptions only suffice to bound the values of Ij(A) and Ij(B), j 0 J
described in Section 3, the BHE should retreat from the traditional idea of using a single threshold to
separate acceptable outcomes from unacceptable ones.  
Bounds on Ij(A) and Ij(B) for j 0 J1 imply bounds on the group average outcome difference 
B). Taken together, the various bounds imply that Decision Stages 1 and 2 cannot be implemented in the
simple manner of Section 6.2. Instead, each stage must allow the possibility that outcomes are judged
acceptable, unacceptable, or indeterminate.
In the micro-evaluations of Stage 1, the performance of each department j 0 J1 might be judged
acceptable if its predicted outcomes meet a high acceptance threshold, determined by applying the lower
bound on Ij(A), the upper bound on Ij(B), and the upper bound on *1(A, B).  Similarly, department j’s
performance might be judged unacceptable if its predicted outcomes fail to meet a low nonacceptance27
threshold, determined by applying the upper bound on Ij(A), the lower bound on Ij(B), and the lower
bound on *1(A, B).  If the predicted outcomes lie between the two thresholds, then the acceptability of
department j’s outcomes is indeterminate and the BHE must use some auxiliary rule to decide whether this
department should have its QUE grant renewed.
Bounds on the performances of individual departments aggregate into bounds on the performance of
the QUE program as a whole in the macro-evaluation of Stage 2.  The mechanics of aggregating the micro-
level bounds may be somewhat complex but the underlying idea is simple enough.  The  performance-based
renewal version of the QUE program should be judged acceptable if the lower bound on its predicted
outcomes is sufficiently high and unacceptable if the upper bound on its predicted outcomes is
sufficiently low.  Otherwise, the overall performance of the program is indeterminate. Much as a
definitive answer to the evaluation problem may be desired, we must emphasize that there is no escape
from the ambiguity of the situation.
We must also point out that the discussion of Section 3 considered a simpler one-stage
evaluation problem than the two-stage problem faced by the BHE in comparing performance-based QUE
renewal with baseline non-competitive funding.  The discussion of Section 3 would apply fully if the BHE
were comparing the indefinite funding version of QUE with baseline non-competitive funding.  In that
case, performance standards would need to be applied only at the macro level described in Decision Stage
2 above.  However the micro level evaluation called from in Decision Stage 1 requires knowledge of the
average outcome, I(A) for each department, not of the average outcome across all departments, E[I(A)
Using E[I(A)*w] in place of I(A) in equation (16) is correct to the extent that w is a good predictor of
I(A), in which case the problem of auxiliary outcomes is solved. 
7. Conclusions:  Should Indeterminacy be Tolerated or Resolved?
In 2002 the BHE will begin the difficult task of evaluating the QUE program.  While many of the28
details of this evaluation remain uncertain, there are general lessons to be drawn.  One is that the BHE
has maintained a useful distinction between monitoring (Section 5) where outcomes under QUE (Program A)
are compared to prespecified outcome targets, and evaluation (Section 6) where outcomes under QUE are
compared to the outcomes that would have occurred under an alternative funding scheme (Program B). 
Another is that evaluation of block grant programs like QUE requires integrated micro evaluation of
individual grantees and macro evaluation of the funding mechanism.
Regardless of the specific evaluation criteria to be applied, planners must confront the fact
the outcomes of interest are not observed.  The outcomes under program A -- mean life-cycle earnings
under the QUE program -- may not be observed until many years after the evaluation. The counterfactual
outcomes under program B -- mean life-cycle earnings under the baseline alternative -- will never be
observed. An evaluator, confronted with the auxiliary and counterfactual outcomes problems, should
combine the available data with credible assumptions on treatments and outcomes.  Given this
information, the performance of a program may be deemed acceptable, unacceptable or indeterminate.
Suppose that an evaluation yields an indeterminate finding about the program’s acceptability. 
What then?  There are potentially two ways to resolve the ambiguity.  One can always impose stronger
assumptions.  One can sometimes collect richer auxiliary outcome and/or historical data. 29
It is tempting to impose assumptions strong enough to yield a definitive finding.  Whereas data
collection can be costly and time-consuming, imposing assumptions requires only a leap of faith. The
problem, of course, is that strong assumptions may be inaccurate and yield flawed conclusions. Even if
an evaluator personally considers an assumption to be plausible, he must be concerned about the
credibility of his findings to policymakers and the public.  These may be a diverse group some of whose
members may not share the evaluator's beliefs about what are and are not plausible assumptions.  The
evaluator must keep in mind that the weaker the assumptions imposed, the more widely credible are the
reported findings.  Let us face the fact that imposing assumptions that are not credible does not
eliminate the ambiguity in the evaluation problem.
If stronger assumptions are not imposed, the only way to resolve an indeterminate finding is to
collect richer outcome data. We have examined the evaluation problem given specified data, without
saying anything about how these data came to be available.  In practice, evaluators play a role in
determining what outcome data should be collected. Evaluators may be able to influence the collection of
historical data on auxiliary outcomes and outcomes of interest, thus enabling application of the ideas
developed in Sections 3.1.  Evaluators may also be able to influence the collection of outcome data in
program A, thus reducing the distance between the available auxiliary outcomes and the outcomes of
interest. If it is feasible to collect richer outcome data, either historical data or outcome data on
program A, then the evaluator must decide whether the benefits of new data collection exceed the cost. 
After all, new data cannot resolve the problem of counterfactual outcomes. Even if the outcomes under
program A are known with certainty, the findings may remain indeterminate; outcomes under program A may
lie within the bounded threshold of program B.
It is important to stress that an indeterminate finding does not imply that the planner should
be unwilling or unable to make decisions. It only implies that the planner should not claim that his
decisions are optimal.30
References
Balke, A. and J. Pearl (1997). “Bounds on Treatment Effects from Studies With Imperfect Compliance,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 92, 1171-1177.
Berger, J.  (1985). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. Springer-Verlag, New York.
Björklund, A. and R. Moffitt (1987). “Estimation of Wage Gains and Welfare Gains in Self-Selection
Models.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 69, 42-49.
Cave, M. and S. Hanney, “Performance Indicators,” In B. Clark and G. Neave (editors), The Encyclopedia
of Higher Education, Volume 2, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1411-1423.
Cornfield, J., W. Haenszel, E. Hammond, A. Lilienfeld, M. Shimken, and E. Wynder (1959), “Smoking and
Lung Cancer: Recent Evidence and a Discussion of Some Questions,”  Journal of the Natiohnal Cancer
Institute, 22, 173-203.
Friedlander, D., D.H. Greenberg and P.K. Robins (1997), “Evaluating Government Training Programs for the
Economically Disadvantaged,” The Journal of Economic Literature. XXV(4), 1809-1855.
Heckman, J. and B. Honore (1990), “The Empirical Content of the Roy Model,” Econometrica
Heckman, J. and J. Hotz (1989), “Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental Methods for Estimating the
Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Manpower Training,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 84, 862-874.
Heckman, J. and R. Robb (1985), "Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions," in J.
Heckman and B. Singer (editors), Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market Data, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Heckman, J., J. Smith, and N. Clements (1997), “Making the Most Out of Programme Evaluations and Social
Experiments: Accounting for Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts,” Review of Economic Studies
536.
Hotz, V.J., C. Mullins and S. Sanders (1997). “ Bounding Causal Effects Using Data from Contaminated
Natural Experiment: Analyzing the Effects of Teenage Childbearing,” Review of Economic Studies
604.
Keynes, J. (1921).  A Treatise on Probability. MacMillian.
Knight, F. (1921).  Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.  Houghton-Mifflin, Boston.
Lazear, E.P. (1995). Personnel Economics. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
Maddala, G.S. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Manski, C.(1988), Analog Estimation Methods in Econometrics, London: Chapman & Hall.
Manski, C. (1989), "Anatomy of the Selection Problem", Journal of Human Resources, 24, 343-360.31
Manski, C. (1990), "Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment Effects," American Economic Review Papers and
Proceedings, 80, 319-323. 
Manski, C. (1994), "The Selection Problem," in C. Sims (editor), Advances in Econometrics
Cambridge University Press.
Manski, C. (1995), Identification Problems in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Manski, C. (1997a), “Monotone Treatment Response,” Econometrica, 65, 1311-1334.
Manski, C. (1997b), "The Mixing Problem in Program Evaluation,"Review of Economic Studies
Manski, C. (1999), “Identification Problems and Decisions Under Ambiguity: Empirical Analysis of
Treatment Response and Normative Analysis of Treatment Choice,” Journal of Econometrics
Manski, C. and D. Nagin (1998), "Bounding Disagreements About Treatment Effects: A Case Study of
Sentencing and Recidivism," Sociological Methodology 1998, Vol. 28, 99-137.
Manski, C. and J. Pepper (2000), “Monotone Instrumental Variables with An Application to the Returns to
Schooling,” Econometrica, forthcoming. 
Pepper, J. (1999), “What Do Welfare-to-Work Demonstrations Reveal to Welfare Reformers?” Joint Center
for Poverty Research Working Paper, #2, August.
Pepper, J. (2000), "The Intergenerational Transmission of Welfare Receipt: A Nonparametric Bounds
Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
Robins, J. (1989), “The Analysis of Randomized and Non-Randomized AIDS Treatment Trials Using  a New
Approach to Causal Inference in Longitudinal Studies,” in Sechrest, L., H. Freeman, and A. Mulley. eds.
Health Service Research Methodology: A Focus on AIDS, NCHSR, U.S. Public Health Service.
Robins, J. and S. Greenland (1996), “Comment on Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin’s ‘Identification of Causal
Effects Using Instrumental Variables’,” Journal of the American Statistical Association
Rosenbaum, P.R. (1995). Observational Studies. Springer Series in Statistics, Springer-Verlag, New York.
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin (1983).  Assessing the Sensitivity to an Unobserved Binary Covariate in
an Observational Study With a Binary Outcome.  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society
212-218.
Spencer, B. (1985), “Optimal Data Quality,” Journal of the American Statistical Association
573.
Spencer, B. and L. Moses (1990), “Needed Data Expenditure for an Ambiguous Decision Problem,” 
the American Statistical Association, 85, 1099-1104.
Wald, A. (1950). Statistical Decision Functions. Wiley, New York.
Walley. P.  (1991). Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chapman & Hall, London32
Table 1:  Performance Indicators for the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Indonesia
Performance Indicators Baseline Midterm Final
1. NEE Score 750 770 790
2. GPA 2.57 2.65 3.00
3. TOEFL Score 450 475 495
4. Time to Degree (years) 6.30  5.90  5.00
5. Time to Employment (mo) 1.5 1.2 1.0